Breviloquium

Concerning the wisdom of God, moreover, these things are to be held: that divine wisdom itself knows most limpidly all good and evil, past, present, and future, actual and possible, and thereby things incomprehensible to us and infinite; yet in such a way that it is in no way diversified in itself, although it receives diverse names. — Insofar as it is cognizant of all possibles, it is called knowledge or cognition; insofar as it is cognizant of all that comes about in the universe, it is called vision; insofar as it is cognizant of all that is done well, it is called approval; insofar as it is cognizant of what is future, it is called foreknowledge or foresight; insofar as it is cognizant of what is to be done by God himself, it is called disposition:¹ insofar as it is cognizant of what is to be rewarded, it is called predestination; but insofar as it is cognizant of what is to be damned, it is called reprobation.

And because it is not only cognizant but is also the reason for knowing, therefore, insofar as it is the reason for knowing all things known, it is called light; insofar as it is the reason for knowing things seen and approved, it is called mirror; insofar as it is the reason for knowing things foreseen and disposed, it is called exemplar; but insofar as it is the reason for knowing things predestined and reprobated, it is called the book of life. — The book of life, therefore, is with respect to things as returning; the exemplar, as going forth; the mirror, as proceeding; but light with respect to all.² — To exemplar pertain idea, word, art, and reason: idea, according to the act of foreseeing; word, according to the act of proposing; art, according to the act of pursuing; reason, according to the act of perfecting, because it adds the intention of the end. — But because all these are one in God, one is therefore frequently taken for another.

And although divine wisdom receives diverse names by reason of the diversity of things known and connoted, it is nevertheless not diversified according to its intrinsic character. For it knows contingent things infallibly, mutable things immutably, future things presently, temporal things eternally, dependent things independently, created things in an uncreated way, and things other than itself in itself and through itself.³ — And since it knows contingent things infallibly, freedom and mutability of will stand together with predestination and foreknowledge.

The understanding and reason of the foregoing is this: since the first principle, by the very fact that it is first and highest, has knowledge at once most simple and most perfect: because it is most perfect, it knows all things most distinctly under all the conditions that things have or can have; and therefore it knows future things as future and present things as present; and it knows good things as to be approved, and evil things as to be reprobated: hence it receives diverse names, as was said above.⁴

But because perfection of wisdom stands together with supreme simplicity, hence it is that it knows everything other than itself in itself and through itself; from this follows the second, that it knows created things in an uncreated way; from this follows the third, that it knows dependents independently; from this arises the fourth, that it knows temporal things eternally; from this the fifth, that it knows future things presently; from this the sixth, that it knows mutable things immutably; from this the seventh, that it knows contingent things infallibly.⁵

And thus contingent things, remaining contingent, are altogether infallible to divine wisdom, both in contingent things subject to nature and in the freedom of the human will. — Hence whoever wishes to understand this truth, how the freedom of created will stands together with the infallibility of eternal predestination, should proceed by resolving from this last point through those seven degrees to the first: namely, that the first principle knows all things most perfectly through itself, which is the most certain truth; from this the other things stated above are infallibly concluded by reasoning.⁶

Just as the certainty of divine knowledge stands together with the contingency of known things, because divine wisdom is at once most simple and most perfect, so unity stands together with the multiformity of reasons and ideas for the same reason. For because it is most perfect, it knows most distinctly all universal and singular things and represents all of them most distinctly and perfectly; and therefore it is said to have reasons and ideas of singular things as likenesses most perfectly expressive of things. — But because it is most simple, all those likenesses are one in it. Hence, just as God by one power produces all things in time according to the complete integrity of things, so by one truth he expresses all things eternally. And just as there is in the Most High God one active operation according to the reality of the thing, yet several productions of things are called such by reason of the plurality of products, so there is one truth of one act of understanding in God; yet several likenesses, ideas, and reasons are called such by reason of the plurality of things ideated, whether existing, future, or possible. But these reasons or ideas, although they are one truth, light, and essence,⁷ are nevertheless not said to be one reason or idea. For reason or idea is spoken of as relative to another according to the manner of understanding. For it names the likeness of the thing known, which really belongs on the part of God, although according to the manner of understanding it seems to express something on the part of the thing ideated.⁸

But if a likeness of this is sought in a creature, it must be said that this is proper to that exemplar; because, as was said, it is at once simple, infinite, and most perfect, and once it is understood beforehand, the rest consequently become known. For because that exemplar is most simple and most perfect, it is therefore pure act; but because it is infinite and immense, it is therefore outside every genus.⁹ And hence it is that, being one in existence, it can be an expressive likeness of many.