Breviloquium

For the catholic expression of this faith also, it is to be held according to the teachings of the holy Doctors that in God there are two modes of predicating, namely by mode of substance and of relation; three modes of suppositing, namely of essence, of person and of notion; four modes of signifying substance, namely by the name of essence, of substance, of person and of hypostasis; five modes of saying, namely who, which, which, that which, and what; and three modes of differing, namely according to different mode of existing, according to different mode of bearing oneself, and according to different mode of understanding.¹

The reason of the aforesaid is this: because, since the first principle is at once most perfect and most simple, all things that are of perfection are said of it properly and truly; but things that are of imperfection are either not said, or if said, are said according to the assumption of human nature, or transferentially. Since therefore there are ten predicaments, namely substance, quantity, relation, quality, action, passion, where, when, site and having;² the last five properly regard corporeal or mutable things; therefore they are not attributed to God except in a transferred and figurative mode. But the other five preceding are attributed to God, according to that which they bespeak of completion, yet so that they do not impede divine simplicity. All these predicaments, therefore, are the very thing which is that of which they are predicated; and thus by comparison to the subject in which they are, all are said to pass over into substance, relation alone excepted; which, since it has a twofold comparison, namely as to the subject in which, and as to the term to which, in the first mode passes over, lest it make composition, in the second mode remains, that it may make distinction. And hence it is that "substance contains unity, and relation multiplies trinity";³ and therefore there remain there only these two different modes of predicating. — Of which such a rule is given: that things said according to substance are said of all both singly and together and singularly; but things according to relation are either not said of all, or if of several, plurally, as related, distinct, like, equal, on account of intrinsic relation. But the name of trinity comprehends both.

And since there can be several relations in one person,⁴ as there are several persons in one nature; therefore distinction in notion does not infer diversification of person, nor distinction of person pluralification of nature. And therefore not whatever befits the essence befits the notion or person, nor conversely. And hence it is that there are there three modes of suppositing; of which such a rule is customarily given: with essence supposed, neither notion nor person is supposed; and with notion supposed, neither essence nor person is supposed; and with person supposed, neither essence nor notion is supposed, as is clear through examples.⁵

And since true distinction is in the supposits of substance, with essence remaining one; therefore it is necessary that substance be signified there manifoldly, namely as communicable and incommunicable. As communicable, by mode of abstraction through the name of essence, and by mode of concretion through the name of substance; but as incommunicable, either as distinguishable through the name of hypostasis, or as distinguished through the name of person. — Or otherwise, namely as distinguished anyhow, and thus hypostasis; or notably and perfectly, and thus person. — Examples of these four are in the creature: humanity, man, some man, Peter; the first bespeaks essence, the second substance, the third hypostasis, and the fourth person.⁶

And because in the person which is distinguished, not only he who is distinguished is to be considered, but also that by which he is distinguished; and this is the property or notion: therefore it is necessary that in God there be five modes of saying and likewise of asking, namely who, by reason of person; which, by reason of hypostasis, because it bespeaks the supposit of substance indistinctly;⁷ what, by reason of notion; that which, by reason of substance; what or whereby, by reason of essence.

And since all these modes are rooted in unity of essence, because whatever is in God is God himself one and alone; therefore they do not posit difference there, neither according to essence nor according to being. And therefore there are there only three modes of differing, namely according to modes of being or emanating, as person differs from person; according to modes of bearing oneself, as person and essence differ — because one person is referred to another, and therefore is distinguished, but essence is not referred to another, and therefore is not distinguished⁸ — according to modes also of understanding, as one substantial property differs from another, as goodness and wisdom. — The first difference is the greatest that can be found in God; for it is in supposits, so that one is not said of another. — The second difference is lesser, because it is in attributes; for although one can be said of another, as person of essence, yet something is said of one which is not said of the other, as: person is distinguished and referred, but essence is not. — But the third difference is least, because it is in connoteds. For although one is said of another mutually, and the same can be said of both;⁹ yet the same is not connoted on both sides, nor through the same is each given to be understood. — From the first mode of differing arises plurality of persons; from the second mode plurality of substantial and relative predications; from the third plurality of essential properties and notions, whether from eternity or from time; whether properly or transferentially; whether commonly or appropriatively.¹⁰ Manifest examples of what is said. — With these understood, it is clear enough both what is to be thought and how to speak of the highest trinity of the divine persons.